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Abstract 
 
Cloud computing is a relatively new technology which is quickly becoming one 
of the most important technological advances for computer science. This 
technology has had a significant growth in recent years. It is now more affordable 
and cloud platforms are becoming more stable. Businesses are successfully 
migrating their systems to a cloud infrastructure, obtaining technological and 
economic benefits. However, others still remain reluctant to do it due to both 
security concerns and the loss of control over their infrastructures and data that 
the migration entails. 
At the same time that new technologies progress, its benefits appeal to 
criminals too. They can not only steal data from clouds, but they can also hide 
data in clouds, which has provoked an increased in the number of cybercrimes 
and their economic impacts. Their victims range from children and adults to 
companies and even countries.  
On the other hand, digital forensics have negatively suffered the impact of the 
boom of cloud computing due to its dynamic nature. The tools and procedures 
that were successfully proved and used in digital investigations are now 
becoming irrelevant, making it an urging necessity to develop new forensics 
capabilities for conducting an investigation in this new environment. As a 
consequence of these needs a new area has emerged, Cloud Forensics, which 
is the result of the intersection between cloud computing and digital forensics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Cloud computing is a relatively new technology which has experienced a rapid 
growth in recent years while offering elasticity, flexibility and services on demand. 
According to the Fourth Annual Future of Cloud Computing Survey results, cloud 
computing continued rising in 2014 with 45 percent of those surveyed declaring 
they run their companies from the cloud. The sharp increase in its use, however, 
is not exempt from critical issues, recent studies have identified a number of them 
related to security (Armbrust, et al., 2009) (Ming and Yongsheng, 2012) (Sinha 
and Khreisat, 2014).  A study also revealed that the main concern is that data is 
stored in an unknown place for the customer, being usually at any location in 
different countries (Sabahi, et al., 2011). 
Unfortunately, cloud computing not only introduces technological and 
economic opportunities but also presents a better and more sophisticated 
environment for criminals (Yan, et al., 2011). Several researchers have claimed 
that cloud architecture also poses certain challenges for conducting forensics 
digital investigations (Taylor, et al., 2011) (Trenwith and Venter, 2013) (Thethi 
and Keane, 2014). Both factors, better environment for criminals and difficulties 
for investigators, have resulted in an augmentation in cybercrime, as it can be 
seen in the recently released 2014 Ponemon Institute annual report, which shows 
that the cost of cybercrime has increased more than 9% over the course of the 
year (see Figure 1). The average time to resolve an attack has also increased to 
45 days, a rise of 40%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The cost of cybercrime and the number of attack (2014 Ponemon Institute annual report) 
This report makes it clear that as Damshenas, et al., (2012) had previously 
pointed out, more attention has to be paid to cloud security and hence to forensics 
investigations in cloud.  
In this paper, we examine the issues that can be an obstacle when conducting 
a cloud based investigation. Much of the work will be focused on reviewing the 
existing literature with the intention to provide a comprehensive analysis. The aim 
is to clarify the stages that need to be followed in an investigation which is 
conducted in the context of cloud computing, answering the follow question: 
Which approaches can reduce the technical complexities associated with 
performing forensics in cloud based environments? 
2. An overview of Cloud Forensics 
 
Digital Forensics is defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) as the application of computer investigations and analysis techniques to 
determine potential evidence with the aim of presenting them in court. 
Carstensen, et al., (2012) said that the phases of a digital investigation process 
consist of examining the possible evidence, preserving the findings and 
maintaining a strict chain of custody for the data obtained, in order to obtain 
reliable final evidence. It is possible to initiate a forensics investigation as a 
request from either a private company or law court and can be done for different 
reasons, such as a criminal investigation, fraudulent activities, pornography and 
so on. In order to perform a digital investigation in a traditional computing 
environment, there are different digital forensics tools that have been successfully 
proved, according to a 2009 Garner study; with regard to the collection and 
preservation data phases, Encase and FDK are the tools which are most widely 
accepted among the forensics community (Heiser, 2009). 
Regarding the evolution of this science, Garfinkel (2010) claims that although 
Digital Forensics has emerged as an important and successful tool in the fight 
against crime, this “Golden Age of Digital Forensics” was due to finish; due to the 
rapid advance of the new technologies, current forensics tools and process will 
quickly become obsolete. The authors also state the necessity of focussing the 
academic research agenda on improving and updating the current tools and 
research process as the way to find a solution.  
As it was predicted, the boom of cloud computing has introduced new 
challenges for digital forensics investigators due to the way in which this 
technology delivers its services. Studies have identified important jurisdictional 
issues concerning lack of international coordination, difficulties in accessing 
evidence, and problems to preserve the integrity of the evidence (Damshenas et 
al., 2012) (Aydin & Jacob, 2013). Timing is another important aspect, Thethi and 
Keane (2014) suggest that this is due to the almost infinite capacity of storage 
that Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) are offering.  Apart from those challenges, 
the nature of cloud computing, which is based on remote storage and 
virtualization technologies, makes it impossible to use traditional forensics tools 
and methodologies (O’Shaughnessy, et al., 2013).  
It was Ruan, et al., (2011) who first introduced the term of cloud forensics 
referring to the growing need for conducting digital investigations in cloud 
computing environments; they define cloud forensics as a new discipline resulting 
from crossing cloud computing and digital forensics, as shown in Figure 2. In the 
same study the researchers mention that this need was expected to rise with the 
growth of cloud computing.  
 
 
         Figure 2. Where is cloud forensics? (Ruan, et al., 2011) 
 
Damshenas, et al., (2012) claim that there is an urgent need to update the 
forensics methods, tools and techniques, and indicate that the main problem is 
the lack of a global cloud computing standard, which provokes confusion among 
the forensics investigators. Many researchers agree with that necessity, which is 
the reason why research to date has focused on formulating different approaches 
to a cloud forensics standard (Dykstra and Sherman, 2012) (Ruan and Carthy, 
2013), however, the lack of procedures and forensics tools still remain a problem 
(Shah and Malik, 2013). NIST has also recently pointed out that there is a 
pressing need to develop forensics protocols, which must address the necessities 
of the investigators and the court system, trying not to alter the way in which the 
CSPs are offering their service or at least minimize this disruption (NIST, 2014). 
3. Dimensions of Cloud Forensics  
 
At this point, saying that computer forensics investigations are compulsory in 
the cloud in the interest of both assessing risk properly and to establish standards 
may seem pretty obvious.  
In order to develop new techniques and tools for conducting an investigation 
the first essential step is to have a comprehensive view of cybercrime 
investigations domain; this understanding would help to define requirements and 
establish a standard (Ciardhuáin, 2004). This process, which was formulated 
trying to help in the development of forensics tools and techniques in a traditional 
environment, could now be extrapolated and applied to do the same in a cloud 
computing based environment. Hence, in the first step we need to gain a good 
understanding of the domain of forensics investigations in this new environment 
and analyse the different scenarios in which a cloud forensic investigation can be 
conducted. 
With the intention to clarify the domain of cloud forensics investigations and 
allow future researchers to develop a standard protocol, Ruan, et al. (2011) 
propose a multidimensional model, which divides into three different areas the 
domain of cloud forensics: organizational, legal and technical, as shown in 
Figure3.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The authors also emphasize how important it is to consider the cloud forensics 
issues as multidimensional instead of only technical issues, and define each 
dimension as follows: Firstly, the procedures and tools needed to conduct a 
forensics investigation in a cloud-based environment compound the technical 
dimension. These procedures need to be done without compromising the 
information of other tenants of the cloud service provider (CSP). Secondly, 
conducting an investigation in cloud implies dealing with third parties, such as 
CSPs; these third parties involved in the investigation process make up the 
organizational dimension. Finally, the legal dimension embraces the challenges 
in relation to different country legislations when conducting an investigation, and 
the preservation of the confidentiality of other tenants of the CSP.   
The researchers not only propose the model but also discuss eight different 
issues or challenges associated with the establishment of a cloud forensics model 
covering the technical, organizational and legal dimensions. The challenges 
named by them are: forensics data acquisition, live forensics, evidence 
segregation, internal staffing, external dependency chains, virtualized 
environment, service legal agreement, multiple jurisdiction and tenancy. The first 
three affect the technical dimension, the next three affect to the organizational 
dimension and the last two affect the legal dimension. Due to constraints we are 
focusing only on the technical dimension in this paper. 
Figure 3. Cloud Forensics three-dimensional model (Ruan, et al., 2011) 
4. Cloud Models and Associated Technical Dimension Challenges  
 
It was above highlighted the necessity of analysing the wide variety of 
scenarios in which an investigation may be conducted, for which we need to 
distinguish the different models of cloud computing. 
The 2011 NIST cloud computing definition classifies into three the service 
models available: Software as a service (SaaS), Platform as a service (PaaS) 
and Infrastructure as a service (IaaS). In the same definition, it mentions private 
clouds, public clouds and hybrid clouds among the deployment models available 
(Liu, et al., 2011).  
Each one, either service or deployment models, have different characteristics 
and represent a different scenario, which makes it more difficult to define a cloud 
forensics standard. Zawoad and Hasan, (2013) point out one of the differences 
when they mention that when conducting an investigation in cloud computing, 
physical access to the evidence is complicated, being currently only possible in 
a private deployment model. Hence, due to the fact that each one presents 
unique features, the investigation process will vary depending on the services 
and deployment model of cloud computing in which the investigation is being 
conducted. The different cloud model also needs to be taken into consideration 
when analysing the different challenges associated. 
In the following sections, the forensics challenges associated to the technical 
dimension are analysed taking into consideration the service and deployment 
model implemented. The analysis is also based on the three-dimensional model 
proposed in Ruan et al. 2011.  
4.1 Forensics Data Collection 
The first one, is the data collection process which has been named as one of 
the most difficult to solved (Zawoad and Hasan, 2013). This is the reason why 
increasing emphasis has been placed on investigating the issues related to data 
acquisition when conducting an investigation in a cloud based environment 
(Ruan, et al., 2011) (Taylor, et al., 2011) (Dykstra and Sherman, 2011). Taylor, 
et al., (2011) say that the impossibility of gaining access to the evidence in Hybrid 
and Public clouds is the main problem of the collecting data process. Ruan et al., 
(2011) adds that it is also important the cloud service model, as the level of control 
that the customer has of its own data depends on the cloud service model 
implemented, IaaS, SaaS or PaaS. Hence, the forensics data collection process 
cannot be the same in different service models, whereas in IaaS we can gain 
access to the virtual machine instance from the customer interface and implement 
some tools, in the first two we exclusively depend on the CSPs (Zawoadand 
Hasan, 2013).   
Dykstra and Sherman (2012) conducted a practical experiment in which they 
used traditional digital forensics tools, Encase and FDK, successfully for 
acquiring forensics data in IaaS. However, they argue that too much trust in the 
cloud provider is needed as it was the provider instead of the investigator who 
had the control over the tools. The intervention of this third party may compromise 
the validity of the evidence in court. They also indicate that the customer 
management plane is the best option for forensics data acquisition in an IaaS 
deployment model, as the investigator can collect forensics data without asking 
for the assistance of the cloud provider. Hence, dependency on the CSP is not 
necessary. Recently, in further research Dykstra, and Sherman, (2013) 
presented a collection of three forensics tools. The tool which is known as 
Forensics Open-Stack Tools (FROST) was installed and successfully proved in 
an OpenStack instance (IaaS). FROST, being integrated into the management 
plane of the CSPs enables forensics investigators to acquire trustworthy 
forensics data of virtual disks, API logs and guest firewall logs. This process is 
developed without any dependency on the CSP. Figure 4 shows how two of the 
OpenStack components, Compute (Nova) and Dashboard (Horizon), have been 
modified to add FROST.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Snippet of the OpenStack architecture using FROST (Dykstra and Sherman, 
2013) 
 
Regarding the SaaS and PaaS service models, it was above highlighted 
the less control that users have in these services models and the limited access 
available in both of them. Dykstra and Sherman (2013) point out makes the 
process of collecting forensics data more complicated.  In further research 
Zawoad and Hasan (2013) refer to recent studies to propose a Trusted Third 
Party Model in which forensics data would be collected by the cloud service 
provider following a set of rules previously established between the third parties 
implied in the process. They also argue that although this model is still immature, 
it could be the only solution in a SaaS service model and also probably in a PaaS 
model. However, both sets of authors agreed in saying that forensics capabilities 
in these service models are immature and still need further research to be 
developed.  
 
4.2 Static, Elastic and Live Forensics 
Recovering deleted data and identifying its owner in order to use them in an 
event reconstruction, represent a challenge in cloud. This is because once data 
is deleted the space is removed from mapping and marked as available for being 
overwritten in a matter of seconds (Ruan, et al., 2011). Birk & Wegener (2011) 
first mentioned persistent storage as a possible solution for the preservation of 
these volatile data. However, it was Zawoad and Hassan (2013) who first 
provided with a guideline for the procedure based on Birk & Wegener (2011) 
findings. They mention two possible scenarios; in the first one the users would 
have available a tool which allows them to preserve the data continuously 
synchronized in any cloud storage. In the second scenario, the user is the person 
who has committed the crime, a situation in which he probably would not have 
interest in using this tool for preserving the evidence. In this case, it would be the 
CSP who needs to manage the mechanism and preserve the data in their 
infrastructure. Finally, the combination of using this tool in both parts would allow 
the forensics investigator to compare them, guarantee the veracity of the data 
obtained and facilitate its acceptation in court. The authors recommend the use 
of this technique in IaaS and PaaS services model. 
Another problem revealed by Ruan, et al., (2011) came when trying to 
construct the timeline of an event. They state that is due to both the large number 
of endpoints and the fact that the data resides in different machines, regions or 
is flowing between the cloud and the endpoint. In Belorkarar & Geethakumari 
(2011) the authors suggest a methodology based on regenerating events while 
doing continuous snapshots, as a solution for this issue.  It is also argued by them 
that the use of this method would result in sequenced and stronger evidence. 
Recently, other researchers have indicated the use of this technique for 
regenerating events. Zawoad and Hasan, (2013) refers to that technique as the 
best option to access all possible kinds of data. Its use has also been indicated 
in Dykstra and Sherman (2013) where they recommend these techniques as an 
ideal and necessary complement for FROST.  
Regarding the SaaS service model, in Zawoad and Hasan, (2013) it is said 
that for the time being it is only the provider who has access to the system logs. 
The authors state that the only way to reduce the level of dependency with the 
CSP is to implement an API in order to make the logs available for an external 
investigator.  
 
 
 
 
4.3  Evidence Segregation 
Although different clients of a cloud are isolated from each other they are 
using different instances running all in the same machine and hence, sharing the 
system audit logs. Which is the reason why supposes a challenge segregate the 
information without compromise the confidentiality of other tenants (Ruan, et al., 
2011). The implementation of the tools addressed in the previous section, either 
FROST or the API system logs, could partially solve the problem, as the 
applications would keep track of the system logs for itself; it would not be 
necessary to access the node logs, hence, the investigation would not 
compromise the data of other tenants. Unfortunately, this solution could be only 
adopted by SaaS and partially by PaaS as it has been seen in the previous 
section. (Zawoad and Hasan, 2013) (Dykstra and Sherman, 2013). 
On the other hand, apart from segregating the system logs, when conducting 
a cloud-based investigation, in a much earlier step, the instance which is being 
investigated needs to be isolated in order to prevent evidence from 
contamination. However, cloud design makes it difficult because more than one 
instance is allocated in the same node, making it likely to lose information if the 
CSP shot down the machine and trys to move it to an isolated node. In this way, 
some isolation techniques, (Failover, Server Farming, Relocation, MITM, 
Address Relocation, Sandboxing and LHFTB), were presented in Delport, Köhn 
& Olivier (2011). Although, their conclusion mentions that none of them can 
individually comply with all the possible scenarios and requirements needed for 
a cloud-based investigation, it also says that a combination of more than one 
technique could be a feasible method to isolate an instance.   
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
It is clear that recently cloud computing has experienced a rapid growth, and 
academic research has focus on its development recent years However, it has 
also been seen how security still remain the biggest obstacle to its adoption 
(Sinha and Khreisat, 2014).  On the other hand, although research has shown 
that there is an urgent need to solve several issues and to develop forensics 
capabilities in cloud-based environments (Taylor, et al., 2011) (Ruan, et al., 2011) 
(Zawoad and Hasan, 2013), according to CSA, 2012 cloud computing is still 
immature and its maturity is expected in the next decade. Hence, there is still 
much work to do in order to include proactive countermeasures in the cloud 
architecture to enhance forensics capabilities for cloud computing. 
In this paper, it has been reviewed and referred some of the solutions that 
different researchers have previously proposed for mitigating or solving the 
technical challenges posed by cloud computing for a forensics investigation in a 
cloud based environment; however, the problem is that among them, only FROST 
has been tested in real conditions. In future we will present and evaluate the 
implementation of a tool called Forensic Evidence Acquisition and Preservation 
Tool (FEAP), which based on snapshot techniques, aim to perform the data 
collection process without the cloud provider assistance. 
Even though, cloud forensics has had improvements in recent years, there 
are still challenges that need further research, such as the current need of 
dependence on CSPs. As Zawoad and Hasan, (2013) point out while introducing 
either a robust API or management plane in their infrastructure, the CSPs would 
shift the remote data acquisition responsibility. Other solution it could be the 
development of either the Trusted Third Party Model proposed or an alternative 
in which it would be the provider who manages the data collection in a trustable 
manner.  
Finally, since Ruan, et al., 2011 proposed the three dimensional model, there 
has been addressed different problems which might be included as part of the 
technical dimension. Several researchers have recently identified timing as an 
important emerging issue, due to the almost infinite storage capacity offered by 
Cloud Computing (Trenwith and Venter 2013) (Thethi and Keane, 2014). Thethi 
and Keane, 2014 add that further research needs to be done to quicken the 
forensics investigation process in order to comply with deadlines. 
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